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Abstract Many accounts of online trust are based upon mechanisms for building
reputation. Trust is portrayed as desirable, and handing off trust is easier if trust is
modelled to be transitive. But in the analysis of cyber-security protocols, trust is usually
used as a substitute for certain knowledge: it follows that if there is no residual risk, then
there is no need for trust. On this grimmer understanding, the less that users are required
to trust, the better. Involuntary transitivity of trust becomes corrosive, because it prevents
participants from having control—or even knowledge—of the risks to which their trust
assumptions expose them. In this paper, we take the stance that controlling the transi-
tivity of trust requires us to recognise trust as a non-referentially transparent modality,
similar to but significantly weaker than the epistemic modalities, and to accept the
corollary that imaginary (indeed—even impossible) threats can have real consequences
that adversely affect online security. An apparently paradoxical outcome is that the
desire of principals to keep their trust assumptions private can actually assist the design
of systems to satisfy multiple security agendas. However, this approach requires agents
to have the capability to predicate accurately about states of affairs that are logically
inconsistent with their beliefs, and consequently, designing systems in this way becomes
more akin to diplomacy than engineering.
Keywords Counterfactual reasoning .Doxastic logic . Intensional properties . Privacy.
Security . Trust
1 Introduction
This paper examines some issues concerning the use of trust assumptions to underpin
the design of secure online systems.
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Trust is an essential ingredient in any distributed system: Alice cannot directly inspect the
state of remote parts of the system, so she must trust Bob to tell her. So far so good—but
what if Bob is trusting Carol? Does this mean that Alice has to trust Carol too?
This didn't matter in the old days, when systems were monolithic. The system
designers specified a uniform security policy, which set out whom everybody trusted,
and for what purposes. Those days are gone. Online systems are increasingly built using
repurposed components, by co-operating participants who have different agendas,
different beliefs about what is acceptable—or even possible—and very different views
about whom they trust.1 There is no “lowest common boss” to whom conflicts can be
appealed, and while governments may be participants, they are no longer in charge and
in most cases don't really want to be. And the stakes are high: online systems broker a
vast amount of sensitive personal information. This sensitive information includes Bob's
trust assumptions, which he may be very unwilling to reveal to Alice.
But trust involves risk. If Alice has to trust Carol whenever Bob does, but has no way
of knowing whom Bob is trusting, then Alice has no way to control the risks to which
she is exposed. This is the problem that we call the promiscuous transitivity of trust.
The keystone of this paper is an argument that trust is not promiscuously transitive.
According to this argument, trust turns out to be an intrinsically intensional notion, one
which involves a doxastic agent and the world as that agent understands it to be: trust
cannot be unpacked into a purely extensional relationship between an agent and the
world as it actually is. However, inferences derived from trust have an intrinsically
weaker epistemic status than knowledge, and agents adhering to different trust policies
may have mutually inconsistent understandings of the world.
The second part of the paper unpicks some of the consequences of this for the design of
online systems that are required to comply with a range of mutually incompatible, and only
partially disclosed, security policies. Our perhaps slightly surprising conclusion is that the
desire of agents to keep their trust assumptions private can potentially assist the seemingly
impossible task of building such systems. However, the resulting approach to system design
is more akin to diplomacy than to engineering.
Compared to the vast amount that has been written on, say, knowledge or truth, the
philosophical literature has historically had surprisingly little to say about trust.2 Fortunately,
that situation is now changing, and recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the
philosophy of trust, particularly of trust on the internet. I'm not going to review this literature
systematically here, but Simpson (2012) gives a superb genealogical map of the different
ways in which the concept of trust has been evoked.
In this paper, I use the word trust in a number of different but interlocking senses,3 some
of them quite technical. Although I maintain that each of these uses has enough in common
with the folk-concept of trust to justify using the word “trust” for it (rather than, say,
“squibble”), I make no attempt to give any complete unpacking of trust. Nor do I seek
1 For example, when I purchase an e-book, the vendor may not be the owner of the digital rights, nor the
host of the website I buy through; I pay using a service such as PayPal, and the content is delivered through
an infrastructure operated by yet another party. On what basis do I believe that I shall receive the correct e-
book, on the correct device, in exchange for the correct charge to my credit card? Who is trusting whom, to
do what? And who has learned what personal information about me in the process?
2 Baier (1986) comments on this “strange silence” in the specific context of moral philosophy.
3 I had some idea of distinguishing these by writing them trust1, trust2 and so on, but gave up shortly after
reaching double figures. I rely instead upon the reader to remain alert to context.
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to establish a semantic monopoly—there is plenty of room for others to use the word
differently. However, I shall mean what I stipulate at each point.
The connotations of “Alice trusts Bob” that I exploit systematically are, firstly that Alice
believes (or at least, commits to behave as if it were the case) that Bob's actions will respect
Alice's interests, in some highly context-dependent sense, and secondly that Alice is
nevertheless open to the possibility that Bob might (might actually, rather than counter-
factually) act otherwise, in such a way that Alice suffers some damage to her integrity.
Similar remarks about stipulation apply to the term “believes”. In this paper, we deliberately
drawno clear distinction between human principals and automated agents acting on their behalf.
Those concerned about attributing opinions to automata can read “believes” as “is authorised to
act as if”, following in the tradition of Burrows et al. (1990), Abadi et al. (1993), etc.
Here is a roadmap for the paper.We start with a quick reviewof the essential role played by
trust in distributed systems and the reasons why transitivity of trust is sometimes enabling and
sometimes corrosive. Next, we disentangle a particular conception of trust, one we claim will
turn out to be useful to the system designer, from a number of other concepts (reliance,
trustworthiness, jurisdiction) with which trust is often naturally aligned.We then demonstrate,
via a flawed proof giving rise to a counterexample, that this conception of trust is not
promiscuously transitive. It turns out that this is the case precisely because the notion of trust
we are using is intrinsically intensional.
Next, we examine in more detail the implications for system design of users being
reticent about their trust assumptions. A consequence of reticence, in the light of the
intensional nature of trust, is that trust-derived beliefs have an intrinsically weak epistemic
status that generally cannot be traded up to knowledge even in principle. We argue that the
resulting ambiguity, about which purpose is served by the various measures introduced to
counter perceived threats, can be exploited so as to provide system designers with more
options and make it easier for users with different agendas to collaborate. Our conclusion
is that it doesn't matter if there is no consensus about why the system is safe to use, so
long as each of the participants has appropriate reasons to believe that it is.
2 The Need for Transitivity
Systems have requirements, which we can think of as desired behaviours for the system. In
terms of the design of the system, requirements generally correspond to predicates that the
global state of the system must satisfy. In a distributed system Alice cannot directly inspect
the state of remote elements of the system. Thus, she is dependent upon representations, in
the form of messages informing her, for example, that the state of Bob's part of the system
satisfies a particular predicate at a particular time. These messages are generally sent as part
of a protocol for changing the global system state.4
4 A protocol is a set of rules which, when correctly implemented, has the effect of changing the global state
of the system in a way that satisfies a particular (protocol dependent) predicate. The rules specify the syntax
of the messages to be exchanged and the semantics of the operations to be carried out when any given
message is received: such operations may involve the making of changes to the local state and the sending
of further messages. Cryptographic techniques can be used to provide Alice with an assurance that a
message is from Bob and is the correct message. However, the protocols used to distribute the crypto-
graphic keys typically themselves presume correct operation of parts of the system remote from Alice, a
point to which we shall return below.
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Alice's security policy must specify the predicates that each part of the system is
required to satisfy in order for her transaction to be carried out securely. But her security
policy must also allow Alice to determine whether or not she is justified in proceeding to
the next step in the protocol on the basis of the messages she has received: in particular,
should Alice believe Bob's representation or not? Alice will need to make some trust
assumptions in order to perform any non-trivial distributed operations at all.5
Many approaches to online trust are based upon some notion of reputation. The idea
is that Bob decides whether or not to trust Carol based upon the reputation that Carol
has. Reputation is initially a feature of the mechanism by which Bob is introduced to
Carol, for example via a trusted third party, such as a close relative or an online trading
site. This reputation is modified in the light of Bob's subsequent beliefs about Carol's
dealings with himself and with other principals, and this in turn affects the initial
reputation that Carol acquires when Bob introduces her to Alice, who trusts Bob.
On this view of trust, it is natural to seek ways of enabling the hand-off of trust bymaking
reputation more public. This enables others to trust someone who is already highly trusted.
Finding the right mechanisms for doing this might be problematic (in a purely technical
sense), but it seems clear that it would be desirable to facilitate the transitivity of trust, so that:
If A trusts B and B trusts C, then it is possible for A to trust C.
Here is a premonition that transitivity of trust is not without its problems:
Bob trusts Carol to service his car. Alice trusts Bob to recommend a suitable garage. Bob recommends Carol to
Alice, based on the excellent service he has received. Is Alice justified in trusting Carol to service her car?
In fact, Carol really fancies Bob and would like to go out with him, which is why he has had such a good
experience. Bob's trust in Carol is justified, and Bob has been honest with Alice, but nevertheless, Alice
ends up with an inferior deal.
The reputation-based approach to trust focuses upon what we might describe as the
supply side—how can we provide more trust? I want to start my argument by looking
instead at the demand side of trust—why do we need to have trust online at all?
Looking at the electronic protocols in which trust features, the answer is almost
always that trust is being used as a substitute for knowledge.
A consequence of using trust as a substitute for knowledge is that there is no trust
without risk: to the extent that we can be certain, we have no need for trust. Helen
Nissenbaum (2001) puts this very well: suppose that Bob is a psychopath who has
been shackled to the wall. Although Alice may feel secure while she is in the room
with Bob, this is not because Alice trusts Bob.6
Trust thus comes with a price tag. The cost of using a trust assumption is exposure
to risk. The situation online is similar to that described by Piero Ferrucci (2006):
5 Generally, Alice will need to combine the dynamic representations made by trusted counterparties in the
system, such as Bob, with static representations about the properties of the system made to Alice by the
system designer. Usually, in today's systems, Alice ends up being effectively forced to trust the system
designer or, at least, to commit to behaving as if she did. As we shall see, this is not actually inevitable. Das
Chowdhury and Christianson (2013) refers to the need for users to trust large parts of the system
infrastructure before being able to accomplish anything at all as “compulsive trust”, in analogy with
compulsive gambling.
6 Although, if Alice lacks the requisite technical expertise herself, she may feel secure because she trusts
the manufacturer of the shackles.
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“To trust is to bet. Each time we trust, we put ourselves on the line. If we confide in a
friend,we can be betrayed. If we put faith in a partnerwe can be abandoned. If we trust
in the world, we can be crushed. Far too often it ends that way. But the alternative is
worse still, because if we do not put ourselves on the line, nothing will happen.”
Usually, when Alice chooses to trust Bob in the online world, it is not because she
particularly desires to accept the risk, but because there is no better available
alternative: if Alice does not make some trust assumptions, she incurs the opportunity
cost of being unable to complete the transaction she wants to make.
On this understanding, the less our system requires Alice to trust, the better, because
the less involuntary risk she is exposed to that something will go wrong. Limiting the
scope of the trust assumptions required by the design of a system is called trust
confinement. We cannot do without trust online, any more than we can in society
generally. But it is desirable that those who use a system be able to keep track of the
risks to which they are being exposed and to choose wisely which risks they invest.
3 The Problem with Promiscuity
Different users of the system generally have different requirements, corresponding to
their different agendas and security policies.7 For example, Alice wants the system to
give her money when she puts her card into a cash machine, even though her account
is at another branch. Alice's primary concern is being able to withdraw money when
she does have it. On the other hand, the bank is concerned to make sure that Alice
cannot withdraw money that she does not have. It is generally very hard to design
systems so that they will demonstrably meet the requirements of disparate groups of
users who subscribe to different security policies and trust assumptions.8
Some users of the system have desires that correspond to behaviour that the
designers do not wish the system to exhibit. For example, Rob would quite like to
be able to take Alice's money out of her account without her permission or prior
knowledge. Such users9 are called attackers. Note that Rob may also be a legitimate
user of the system, with an account at the same branch as Alice.
In order to satisfy Alice's requirements, the system must behave in a way consis-
tent with Alice's security policy. Alice needs to be able to prove that the system will
comply with her security policy—for example that only she, and merchants that she
has authorised, are able to remove money from her account. To this end, Alice will
need to make some trust assumptions in order to be able to prove that the system (as
specified) will exhibit the behaviours that she wants it to have.10
7 In this paper, we draw no particular distinction between security requirements and other types of
requirement, preferring to treat all requirements as having potential implications for security. The point is
that (a) Alice may have requirements that translate into restrictions upon how Bob may interact with the
system, and (b) Bob may not share Alice's view about whether these restrictions are appropriate.
8 We shall see shortly that the designer's task is apparently made even harder by the fact that users are often
unwilling to reveal their trust assumptions or are even willing to be deceitful about them.
9 Or, at least, users behaving in such a way.
10 We include non-performance as a type of behaviour, so this statement can include assertions that the
system does not exhibit behaviours that Alice wants it to not have. In technical terms, behaviour
specification includes both safety and liveness properties.
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Alice thus has a trust confinement problem: in order to control the risks to which
she is exposed, she needs to be able to ensure that assertions such as
< Alice trusts Rob >
cannot somehow find their way into the set of statements that can be proved about the
system.
However, if trust is promiscuously transitive, in the sense that we have:
If < < A trusts B > and < B trusts C > > then < A trusts C >
as a rule of inference, then Alice is in trouble: Bob could decide to trust Rob without
Alice's consent—or even knowledge—and Alice would then be trusting Rob even
though she believes that Rob is an attacker—and worse, if Bob does not share his
trust assumptions with Alice, then Alice may not even be aware that she is trusting
Rob until it is too late.
Hidden trust assumptions lie at the root of many security problems. As an example, consider key
distribution: how can Edwina be sure that she is using the correct public key for George, whom she has
never met in real life?
A classical hierarchy of public key certification authorities (A, B and C) is shown in Fig. 1, along with some
of their clients (D, E, F and G). The solid arrows show direct knowledge of public keys, and the dotted
arrows show trust about key provision.
E wants to learn the public key of G. E trusts B to provide E with the correct public key for G; however, B
does not know the public key of G. B trusts A to provide B with the correct public key for G, but A does not
know the public key of G either. C knows the public key of G, so in order for E to prove that he has the
correct public key for G, E must assume that A trusts C.
Thus, as well as assuming that trust is transitive, clients must also assume that trust between certification
authorities is symmetric. An immediate corollary of this is that all certification authorities in the tree trust
one another, whence clients must trust the entire tree.11 At this point, the hierarchical approach to key
certification becomes hopelessly risky.
This type of trust explosion is not confined to hierarchical approaches: analogous problems arise in key
handoffs based on web-of-trust models such as Phil Zimmerman's Pretty Good Privacy.12
A major advantage of public key over symmetric key cryptography is the capability it
provides for localisation of trust, but this localization is lost if Alice's trust can be handed
off promiscuously, thereby exposing Alice to risks of which she is not aware.
How can Alice limit the risks to which she is exposed or even maintain awareness
of what these risks are? If trust is promiscuously transitive, then trust confinement
appears to be an intractable problem.
4 Disentangling Trust
How can we limit the transitivity of trust? Some approaches to unpacking the
semantics of trust have the effect of forcing trust to be promiscuously transitive,
and I shall argue that such approaches are mistaken. Before we pass on to this, it will
11 Neither F nor G played any active part in the protocol, but the only way E can distinguish F's key from
G's is for E to trust C.
12 See Herald et al. (2010) for details.
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be helpful to distinguish trust from some other notions with which trust is often
naturally aligned.
The first of these is reliance. If Alice relies upon Bob to carry out some operation, and
Bob in turn relies upon Carol, then Alice is relying upon Carol whether she knows it or
not. However, it does not follow that any trust is involved. Reliance need not involve
openness to risk in the same way as trust: Alice may have a way of checking whether or
not Bob has done what he is supposed to do. Alice is not authorised to issue an ISO/IEC
27001 security compliance certificate for her software, whereas Bob is. Bob is relying
upon Carol to carry out the appropriate tests before Bob issues the certificate. However,
the tests that Carol is required to carry out are in the public domain, and if Alice has the
required skill,13 she can carry out the same tests and determine whether or not Bob has
acted correctly, regardless of whether Alice is aware of Carol's involvement. The case of
online transaction validation is similar: for example, Alice may be able to verify, but not
generate, Bob's asymmetric key signature on the transaction. Conversely, Alice may
trust Bob to do something for her that she could alternatively do perfectly well for
herself: in this case, she is not reliant upon Bob.
Another notion from which trust should be distinguished is belief in trustworthiness.
Saying that Alice trusts Bob is conceptually a very different statement to saying that
Alice believes that Bob is trustworthy.14 There are many scenarios in which these two
concepts have a natural alignment.15 However, I claim that for some of the scenarios
13 And, if Alice does not have the skill herself, then Alice can ask Dolby, whom she does trust, to do the
checking for her.
14 I part company with a number of philosophers at this point, notably with Russell Hardin (2004). I should
say at once that there are also perfectly respectable computer scientists who, like Hardin, unpack trust as
belief in trustworthiness, although, in some cases, these are regarded as metric, rather than binary,
quantities, with the amount of trust being a measure of the strength of the belief in trustworthiness.
Bishop (2003), for example, defines trust as “a measure of trustworthiness, relying on the evidence
provided”. Others, such as Anderson (2010), follow a similar line to ours: Alice trusts Bob if Bob has
the power to violate Alice's security policy.
15 Simpson's “cognitive trust” is an example of such an alignment, but he is careful to qualify the contexts
in which it applies.
A
B C
D E F G
Fig. 1 A public key certification hierarchy
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discussed in this paper, forcing trust to align with trustworthiness in this way distorts the
semantics of one or the other to the point where a useful word is wasted.
That Alice believes that Bob is trustworthy does not entail that Alice actually trusts
him: Alice may have no need to do so or may prefer to trust somebody else. Conversely,
the fact that Alice trusts Bob online does not entail that Alice believes that Bob is
trustworthy: Alice may trust Bob because she has no choice, because she prefers
accepting the risk to foregoing the transaction or because Alice's security policy says
that her insurance underwriter will accept liability for the consequences if Bob does
something wrong.16 Of course, Alice may be more willing to trust Bob if she believes
that the risk is lower, but this is not quite the same relationship between the concepts.
Finally, trust is not the same as belief in jurisdiction. Many of the messages which
are exchanged in our protocols are effectively performative speech acts17: if Bob has
control over some aspect of the system state, such as key allocation, then the fact that
Bob asserts “Alice, your key is K” is precisely what makes that statement true. We
need to distinguish carefully between:
Alice believes < X because < Bob says X > >
and the more general
< Alice believes X > because < Bob says X >
The first of these statements expresses Alice's belief in Bob's jurisdiction over X; the
second is more like what we intend by trust. In the first case, Alice might be factually
wrong (if it turns out that B saying X is not what makes X true after all); in the second
case, Alice cannot be factually wrong (since Alice does, as a matter of fact, believe X
because Bob said X) although she may be wrong (in a different sense) to have trusted
Bob about X if it turns out that her trust was misplaced.
In the next section, we construct an invalid argument for the promiscuous transi-
tivity of trust. We shall see that this “proof” of transitivity fails in an interesting way,
which sheds light on the intensional nature of trust.
In the following sections, we shall exploit this insight to explore a novel understanding of
secure system design—specifically to draw some lessons about how to model systems that
are going to be shared by groups of users who do not share their security policies.
5 Trust and Reticence
For the purpose of this section, we shall formally model trust as an inference rule,
along the line identified towards the end of the previous section:
A trusts < B about X > =
If < A believes < B says X > > then < A believes X >
where each schema applies to all X satisfying some syntactic condition that depends on A
and B.
16 An extension of this argument, by allowing principals to act as underwriters for one another, leads to a
genuinely transitive notion called Trust*, described by Clarke et al. (2012).
17 In the sense of Austin (1962)
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Schneier (2012) gives some everyday examples for X:
“I trust Alice to return a $10 loan but not a $10,000 loan, Bob to return a
$10,000 loan but not to babysit an infant, Carol to babysit but not with my
house key, Dave with my house key but not my intimate secrets, and Ellen with
my intimate secrets but not to return a $10 loan. I trust Frank if a friend vouches
for him, a taxi driver as long as he's displaying his license, and Gail as long as
she hasn't been drinking.”
More formally, X may stand for an assertion about the present (or future) state of
part of the system, a predicate or a relation (which may be a second-order relation)
involving A, B and possibly other parties, or even another schema.18 We remark in
passing that this approach encompasses delegation.19
A more systematic formal development could proceed along the lines of Primiero
and Taddeo (2012), adding epistemic contexts and justifications to the environments
of the schemata, but I intend not to say too much about further details of the
formalism as I want the argument to be quite general. What we have specified here
will suffice for the purpose at hand.
At first sight, our trust inference rule appears to make trust a consequence of belief
in trustworthiness after all: for if we unpack
B is trustworthy about X =
If < B says X > then X
then it follows that
If < A believes < B is trustworthy about X > > then
If < A believes < B says X > > then < A believes X >
But we need to be careful here: the inference rule given above for trust
addresses only one of trust's crucial properties. What is being modelled here is
what we might call latent trust: Alice would believe X if Bob said X, and this
is all that can be derived from belief in trustworthiness. The case where Alice
actually does believe X because she believes that Bob did say X, we might call
actuated trust.20
It is the possibility that trust might become actuated that makes trust risky, and it is
arguable that without this possibility, Alice isn't actually trusting Bob at all, even
though (counterfactually) she might have trusted him.21
18 We shall see later that X may stand for an intensional relation, for example
X = < C believes < D trusts < A about < good_wine (T) > > > >.
19 In the schema < Alice trusts < Bob about X > >, X can take the form “Bob has used Alice's credit card to
purchase G” or “Bob has committed Alice to do Y”. See Crispo and Christianson (1999) for more on the
semantics of delegation.
20 The distinction is similar to that between “I would trust Bob with my life (if I ever needed to)”, and “I
trust Bob with my life (every weekend when we go rock climbing).”
21 For the distinction between actual and counterfactual possibilities, I am formally following a standard
two-dimensional modal semantics, similar to that debated by Stalnaker and Baldwin (2001), although I do
not commit here to any particular metaphysical position on the status of other worlds.
Living in an Impossible World 419
For example, it may be that Alice already knows X, won't ever make a decision
that is based on X, prefers to trust somebody other than Bob about X or knows that
Bob will never say X: in all these cases, the inference rule has no effect.
Paradoxically, this is arguably also the case if Alice can be certain that Bob is
trustworthy—for example, because she has personally certified the code that she
herself loaded into his tamper-proof hardware—the argument is that Alice doesn't
actually trust Bob, because there is no risk: the effect of a cast-iron proof of
trustworthiness is to shackle Bob to the wall.
Next, we define two subsidiary notions:
A trusts < B competent about X > =
If < A believes < B believes X > > then < A believes X >
A trusts < B honest about X > =
If < A believes < B says X > > then < A believes < B believes X > >
Certainly, trust in competence and trust in honesty jointly entail trust.22
Now let us attempt to establish promiscuous transitivity of trust as a derived
inference rule and see what goes wrong.
Assume:
A believes < A trusts < B about X > >
A believes < B trusts < C about X > >
A believes < C says X >
Required:
A believes X
Remember, we are going to establish that the conclusion does not follow, so it is all
the better if we do this under strengthened premises. We therefore choose to substitute
for the assumption that A trusts B, the jointly stronger assumptions23:
A believes < A trusts < B competent about X > >
A believes < A trusts < B honest about X > >
We suppose that A has an excellent inference engine, which reasons as follows:
Suppose that B were aware of the facts, i.e. that B believes what A believes about
what C said. Then B would believe < C says X >. Therefore, since
< B trusts < C about X > >
22 A similar decomposition of trust is made by Hardwig (1991), but in a starkly different setting: his context
is the role played by trust in sharing knowledge (not mere belief) in Science and Mathematics—extreme
instances of monolithic fully shared security policy—for which honesty is crucial. I shall be using this
decomposition only for the purpose of the present argument, the formal point being that the conjunction of
the two is a strictly stronger premise. In a subsequent section, I shall argue against the utility of honesty as a
component of trust in the context of distributed systems security.
23 Note that we do this only for A trusts B, not for B trusts C.
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B would believe X under circumstances that are, in fact, true. Therefore, since
A believes < A trusts < B competent about X > >
A would believe X under circumstances that are, in fact, true.
Thus, from < A believes < C says X > >, A can deduce < A believes X >.
Therefore, A believes < A trusts < C about X > >. QED.
Clearly, something is wrong: nowhere have we used the assumption
< A trusts < B honest about X > >.
Our “proof” would work even if B were not honest.
Here is a counterexample24 to demonstrate that the conclusion really is not entailed by the premises:
Carol holds the back-up key for Bob's presence in the Cloud. Alice trusts Bob; Bob trusts Carol. Carol is
threatened with a fatal power-down while Bob is offline.
Should Carol broadcast the key or destroy the key?
This reflects a common situation, where two security requirements conflict. The first requirement is an
availability requirement: Bob must have access to the key. The second is a confidentiality requirement: only
Bob may have access to the key. Broadcasting the key will ensure that the first requirement continues to be
met, but will break the second. Destroying the key will ensure that the second requirement continues to be
met, but will break the first. Which requirement is primary? This is specified by Bob's security policy,
which Alice does not know, but which Bob trusts Carol to follow.
Carol says to Alice:
“Here is a message for Bob. Please tell him his key is 281478a6f9032e49.”
Bob knows that this means that Carol has successfully destroyed the key.
Carol's message said something different to Bob to what it said to Alice. Bob and Carol have deceived Alice. Alice
trusts Bob, but Bob did not betray Alice's trust: Bob did not say anything to Alice or to anyone else.25 Even if Alice
believes that Carol will be honest to Bob, this does not require Carol to be honest to Alice.
What can we conclude from this? The moral of our failed proof is that reticence26 can
block transitivity. What B would believe about what C says isn't just a question of fact.
A cannot deduce
< B believes < C says X to B > >
from
< A believes < C says X to A > >.
Our crude model of trust is therefore in need of refinement. A number of
possibilities present themselves. One possibility is:
A trusts < B about X > =
If < A believes < B says X to A > > then < A believes X >
24 Adapted from Christianson and Harbison (1997)
25 Bob could actuate Alice's trust by saying to Alice something different to what Carol said: but even in this
case, the fact that Carol could break Bob's security policy does not entail that Carol could break
Alice's—although Bob can. The point is that Alice's inference about what Bob believes is invalid.
26 We use the term reticence to include deception as well as concealment of beliefs. The term is not
intended to be pejorative.
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This reformulation leaves it open to A to make additional assumptions, if she
chooses, of the form27:
If < A believes < B says X to C > > then < A believes < B says X to A > >
It is tempting to go on and consider how to refine our logic, but this would take us
too far afield. We already have enough for what we need, and we turn now to
considering the consequences of intransitivity for our agenda of secure system design.
The messages to take away from this formal interlude are that trust is not promiscu-
ously transitive and that the intransitivity comes about as a result of the intensional
nature of trust, combined with the reticence of principals about their trust assumptions.
6 Intensional Trust
Our conclusion from the previous section is that trust is a modality similar to an
epistemic modality, indeed that trust is doxastic: statements about beliefs held by
particular principals must be unpacked in terms of their reasons for holding those beliefs,
not in terms of the facts which would make those beliefs true in the actual world.
The analysis of trust must thus consider intensional conditions and not just
extensional properties of the system.
In particular trust, like knowledge, is not referentially transparent. For example, Alice
may trust Heosphoros but not trust Hesperos, because she does not realise that these two
entities are the same in real life. One of the very problematic aspects of cyberspace, as
distinct to the physical world, is the great difficulty involved in knowing when two entities
are in fact the same.28 This is why it is not safe for Alice to adopt a strategy of “trust by
default” for remote individuals, trusting Rob until he proves himself untrustworthy, since
Rob can simply re-present himself as Bob, and Alice has no way of knowing whether Bob
and Rob are the same or different principals.29
Distributed systems are ultimately built in order to enable individuals to extend the
reach of their societal interactions. However, the various individuals and organisa-
tions interacting online increasingly have different requirements, different security
policies, including different trust assumptions, and consequently may hold radically
different beliefs about the properties of the system. The state of the system that Alice
believes actual may be one that Bob believes impossible, and vice versa.30
27 This form includes the case where a public announcement by B suffices.
28 In cyberspace, we generally have no way to distinguish digital entities by inspecting the physical matrices upon
which they are instantiated. All thatwe can access remotely are abstract bit patterns. Bit patternsmay be linked to other
bit patterns by cryptography, but establishing remotely verifiable bindings between bit patterns in cyberspace and the
real-world physical entities to which they refer turns out to be a startlingly difficult problem. In part, this is because,
considered as abstractions, bit patterns have no provenance: it's not an epistemic problem to decide which is the
original andwhich is the copy, for example, there really is no fact of thematter. See Christianson andMalcolm (1998)
for more on this issue.
29 This form of attack is a partial converse to identity theft: “Bob” is Rob, but doesn't wish to be identified
as Rob. If the cost of cloning identity is low, reputation systems are vulnerable to a Sybil attack, the online
equivalent of ballot stuffing.
30 Indeed, Alice and Bob may not agree even about which states of the system are alethically admissible,
let alone acceptable. We return to this point below. A regrettably classic example is the case of phantom
withdrawals: the bank is sure that the customer authorised the withdrawal (because the bank trusts the
security module), and the customer is sure that they did not.
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Even when Alice and Bob do share a belief, they may have radically different
grounds for holding it—and they may be unwilling to share these grounds. There are
many motives for not sharing information, including commercial confidentiality and
considerations of personal privacy.
Among the information which they may not be willing to share is the content of
their security policies: our security policy and our trust assumptions reveal a great
deal about us, and we may not wish to violate our privacy by allowing other parties
unfettered access to them.
As well as trust assumptions, security policies may also include knowledge that the
principals are unwilling to share.31 But in contrast with knowledge, which could in
principle be shared,32 beliefs based upon trust may be innately subject dependent: if
Alice trusts reticent Bob, then she shares some of his beliefs but not all, and their full
belief sets may be mutually inconsistent. Thus, there is in general no possibility of
“trading up” trust-derived beliefs to knowledge.33
What are the implications of this for secure systems design? We shall argue that the
weak epistemic status of trust-based beliefs presents us with an opportunity as well as
a problem. But in order to lay the ground for this argument, we must first examine the
methodology of the design process in more detail.
7 Imaginary Threats with Real Effects
The conventional narrative of secure systems development goes like this.34 Legitimate users
of a system have requirements, which we can think of as predicates that the system state
must be constrained to satisfy. Attackers may potentially perform actions that would cause
these predicates to be violated. Such potential actions are threats. Threats are addressed
by incorporating countermeasures into the design of the system. These coun-
termeasures provide a security service that blocks the threat.
Clients of a telecommunications service need to know the correct account numbers to use for various
online payment transactions. The service posts the up-to-date numbers on a publicly visible notice
board. The requirement is that these numbers be correct.35 An attacker wishes to substitute her own
bank accounts for these numbers. The countermeasure is to provide a digital signature for the content
of the notice board and a key certification service which ensures that only authorised signatures verify
correctly. These mechanisms provide the security service of integrity.
31 Baier (1986) makes this very point in the context of security: “some ignorance in the trusting is proper,
and awareness that such persons [as security officers] may be relying upon one's not knowing what they
know will not destabilize any trust one has in them to do what they are entrusted to do.”
32 I shan't commit to a particular semantics of knowledge, but on most accounts, we have without further
assumption that (a) If Bob knows X, then X, which guarantees inter-subjective consistency, and (b) If Alice
knows that Bob knows X, then Alice knows X, which is precisely Hardwig's testamentary principle T′.
33 Our notion of trust-based belief is thus epistemically rather weaker than the strong form of belief
discussed by Stalnaker (2006). If his Alice believes X, then she must also believe that she knows X (by
his property SB), whereas our Alice may believe X (because Bob says X), but also believe that she does not
know X (because she is taking a risk trusting Bob.)
34 See Stallings (2011) for an even-handed account of the received view.
35 Or at least should be the same as the numbers that the telecommunications company attempted to post.
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Once a countermeasure is deployed, it becomes a part of the system. Consequently,
threat analysis is a recursive process. In a mature system, most threats arise as a result
of countermeasures placed in the system to counteract a different threat.36
A warehouse has a secure area. The threat is that Rob, an unauthorised person, may enter the
secure area. The countermeasure is that Alice, the authorised employee, must enter her unique pass
number into a keypad to open the door. A new threat is that Rob may attempt to determine Alice's
pass number by examining the keypad, for example using an infrared detector or fingerprint dust. A
second countermeasure is that motion-sensitive video cameras are set to record anything in the
vicinity of the door. An interactional threat is that Rob gains access to a discarded video recording
and sees Alice's pass number being typed in. This imposes a new security requirement upon old
video recordings: they must not be viewed by unauthorised persons. The designers of the coun-
termeasures may not have adequately considered the interaction between them.37
Thus, an imaginary38 threat can summon a real one into being: a particular
countermeasure may be essential even though the corresponding threat is imaginary,
because a user who falsely believes the threat to be real will not use the system
unless the countermeasure is present. Which threats are actually real and which
are in fact imaginary is not relevant here: what matters are the beliefs of the
individual principals, derived in accordance with their respective security poli-
cies and trust assumptions.
Alice believes that she is at risk from Carol revealing the secret key they share. Bob knows that Alice is not
at risk, because Bob has secretly installed spyware in Carol's computer, which ensures that she cannot
transmit the key. However, Bob cannot disclose this fact to Alice. In order to persuade Alice that it is safe to
use the system, Bob must agree to use a key escrow service, which Alice believes will block the imaginary
threat. However, unbeknown to Bob, the escrow service has been penetrated by the CIA. This exposes
everyone, including Bob, to a real threat.
Principles may be reluctant to reveal which threats they regard as real and which
threats they regard as imaginary. It is unhelpful to attempt to settle the status of a
threat by an appeal to “facts”: after all, as already remarked, if principals could agree
36 In the sameway as, inmostmature systems, themajority of bugs have their origin in an unsuccessful or partially
successful attempt to fix a previous bug. There are interesting interactions between the analysis of trust used in
game theory (see for example Eckel andWilson (2003)) and the approach to exploiting trust in the design process
described here. For a wonderful account of the threat–countermeasure arms races being played out in casinos, see
Forte (2004), and for an application of this to protocol design, see Clark et al. (2013).
37 This kind of destructive interference between two perfectly rational countermeasures to separate threats
is a common source of the security errors exploited by attackers in practice.
38 Here, by imaginary, I mean something that has certain specified properties but does not exist; see, for
example, Lambert (1983) or Priest (2005). It is tempting to regard the existence or non-existence of a threat
as an ontological issue, but the situation is more complicated. Recall that a threat comprises a sequence of
admissible state transitions that has the cumulative effect of allowing the global state to violate a predicate
corresponding to a system requirement. Alice and Bob may have different beliefs about which states and
transitions are alethically possible. They may also have conflicting beliefs about which current and recent
states of the system are epistemically open, particularly when they are relying on different trust assumptions
in respect of parts remote from themselves; and the predicates that correspond to their requirements are in
any case intensional. Stalnaker (2006) sets out a very sensible conceptual framework for reasoning about
such systems, which does consider the possibility of beliefs being false in fact: but (since his beliefs are
epistemically strong) he follows the traditional position of regarding false beliefs as corresponding to
system faults, rather than seeing their (hopefully unrealized) possibility as a fair price paid for privacy.
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on the facts, there would be no need for trust at all, and we have already seen that
beliefs mediated by trust cannot be cashed out in terms of extensional predicates on
the system.
Consequently, although the first instinct of a systems designer dealing with a
problematic inconsistency is to attempt to settle the matter by looking at how things
actually are (the extensional properties of the state the system is actually in), such an
approach cannot settle inconsistencies arising from incompatible trust assumptions.
The situation for secure distributed systems design now appears desperate: it is not
possible for the principals to agree on the facts, and the principals themselves are
unwilling to reveal their beliefs.39 How can the system designer possibly satisfy Alice
that the system is safe for her to use without inadvertently introducing countermea-
sures that Bob believes make the system unsafe for him40?
We shall argue that the intensional need for reticence, which helps to control the
transitivity of trust and limits risk, is a cause for hope as well as for despair. Far from
needing to arrive at consensus about which threats are real, it suffices in practice to
agree to useful public fictions. The issue is not whether a threat “really is” imaginary,
but whether it justifies an “appropriate” countermeasure.
However, this argument requires us first to analyse more closely the relationship
between countermeasures and threats.
8 Threat/Service Duality
There is a duality between security threats and security services.41 To explain this
duality, we shall use the example of authentication versus plausible deniability.
Alice explains to Bob that from time to time she will provide him with inside information texted from a
series of pay-as-you-go phones. Alice explains the threat of plausible deniability: an impostor such as
Alice's mutant twin sister mAlice might text Bob information claiming that it came from Alice. When Bob
acts upon the information, Alice denies that the information came from her. Bob could not distinguish
deception by mAlice from the case in which Alice had given him the information and then changed her
mind about the wisdom of doing so.42
Alice therefore provides Bob with a mechanism that provides an authentication service. This mechanism43 is
based upon a secret key that Alice shares with Bob. This allows Bob to verify that Alice is the source of a
particular text message.
Alice has deceived Bob about her security policy: in fact, Alice needs to ensure
that the leaked information cannot be attributed to her. For Alice, plausible deniability
is the requirement, and unforgeable authentication is the threat. This is the reason that
39 Whether these are interpreted as opinions or as commitments.
40 Bearing in mind that Bob may not even be willing to say on the record why he considers the system to be
unsafe.
41 This duality was first pointed out by Michael Roe (1997), but the implications appear still not to be
widely understood.
42 In technical terms, the first of these attacks is a masquerade; the second is sender repudiation.
43 For the sake of argument, assume that the mechanism is a Message Authentication Code appended to the
text.
Living in an Impossible World 425
Alice has chosen an authentication protocol based upon symmetric key, rather than
asymmetric key, cryptography.
Alice has provided Bob with a mechanism that allows him to verify that she is the
source of the information that he receives. However, the secret key is shared, and so Bob
can produce the authenticator for any message which Alice can. Thus, Alice's authenti-
cation cannot be passed to policeman Carol or reporter Darren unless they trust Bob
implicitly.44 Alice can deny giving Bob the message and claim that Bob sent it to himself.
Alice has deceived Bob about which was the security requirement and which the threat.45
A corollary of Threat/Service duality is that there is not a unique mapping between
threats and countermeasures: just as there is more than one possible countermeasure to
block a given threat, so for any given countermeasure, there can be more than one threat
which it could plausibly be intended to block. Indeed, in many cases, a single counter-
measure does block more than one threat. For example, a digital signature based upon an
asymmetric key can be used to block both masquerade and sender repudiation.
The following hypothetical examples illustrate the difficulty of inferring a threat from a
countermeasure. They should not be regarded as indicative of any actual bank's practice.
It requires two bank employees with different keys to open the safe. Is this because the bank does not trust
its managers? Is the threat that the manager might take money from the safe for their own use?
An alternative explanation of the two-key rule is that it keeps the families of bank managers safe and
reduces the risk that they will be taken hostage. The threat is that a bank robber will tell the manager to open
the safe if she ever wants to see her children again. The need to coordinate the kidnapping of two families
increases the number of shares into which the stolen money must be divided and the chances that at least
one member of the gang is a police informer. The bank publishes the countermeasure widely (so that bank
robbers realise that a single manager cannot open the safe.) However, the threat remains secret: the bank
does not need to reveal whether or not it trusts its managers.
A video camera records the teller's hands as she carries out banking transactions. Is this because tellers
might short-change customers, by deliberately miscounting cash and pocketing the difference later? This is
the threat perceived by the customer and may be the reason that the customer regards the countermeasure as
a good idea and is willing for it to be paid for out of the overheads on her account.
However, an alternative threat is that a customer waits until the cash is in the till before falsely accusing the
teller of giving a receipt for an amount that is slightly too low, in the hope that the bank will simply pay up
the difference rather than close out the till and take another teller off duty to reconcile the cash tray with the
recorded transactions. With the countermeasure in place, a simple replay of the tape in the bank manager's
office in front of witnesses allows the fraudulent claim to be dismissed. The bank need not reveal to the
teller, or to the customer, which of them they do not trust.
A security screen separates the tellers from the customers. Is the threat that the robber might shoot a teller
who does not comply with a request to empty her till? Or is the threat that a member of the bank staff might
otherwise be tempted to tackle the robber when his back is turned46? The bank need not reveal whom the
screen is intended to protect.
44 In which case they might as well just take Bob's word for the source of the message. Bob giving Carol
the key he shares with Alice is no more convincing for Carol, but has the effect that Bob then has to trust
Carol not to masquerade as Alice.
45 Well, that's Bob's story and it's plausible enough. At the meta-level, Alice and Bob might trust
each other absolutely and be colluding against the District Attorney. As Roe points out, precise
requirements for the plausible deniability service tend not to be specified in system design
documents.
46 Statistically, this type of event is when customers are most likely to get injured, an outcome that neither
banks nor their insurers enjoy.
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The consequence of this is that principals do not need to reveal which threats are
the ones they regard as real: it suffices if they subscribe publicly to a threat that
justifies the countermeasure they seek.47
It may be that all the users of the system believe that a particular threat is
imaginary, but subscribe publicly to it because it justifies a countermeasure that they
all want (perhaps for different private reasons.) Bob does not need to say “I don't trust
Carol”, but can say “Potential future users might be deterred from joining the system
if they were required to trust the key server.”
This provides us with a way out of the design paradox.
9 Designing for the Impossible
Increasingly, online systems are required to support diverse groups of clients who
have very different beliefs about what threats need to be countered and very different
assumptions about whom they trust.
Our task is to design online systems that people believe are safe to use and yet which
support privacy by not requiring people to disclose too much about their security policy
and trust assumptions. Our argument is that, to enable this, we should shift the focus of
our modelling: from extensional properties of the real world in which the system will be
deployed, to intensional properties of the partially overlapping but mutually inconsistent
virtual worlds in which the various rival principals, stakeholders and protagonists of the
system believe themselves to be living.
Bob believes that Alice is living in an impossible world or rather that the world in
which Alice falsely believes herself to live is impossible.48 Bob has no privileged
position. Bob must assume that Alice might have the same view of him and his
beliefs (if she knew what they were): in fact, Bob must consider even the possibility
that Alice's view could be correct, because she may know something that Bob does
not. Nevertheless, Alice and Bob need to be able to trust one another sufficiently to
enable them to cooperate, and for this, they need to be able to interpret each other's
stated beliefs appropriately in the context of their own.49
We need the ability to predicate accurately50 about imaginary threats in impossible
worlds if we are to build systems that allow effective interworking between groups
adhering to conflicting security policies.
We cannot dowithout trust online: we can never prove that a distributed systemmeets
our requirements without making some assumptions based on trust; but trust entails risk,
so we need to be able to contain transitivity; but users are unwilling to reveal to us whom
they trust and for what. Fortunately trust-derived beliefs about remote parts of the system
47 Selection of the preferred countermeasure from the ones that would block the real threat may be
conditioned by which of these countermeasures has a suitable publicly acceptable alternative threat to act
as cover story. And as usual, a good strategy for preserving privacy is to behave slightly irrationally.
48 By impossible here we mean something similar to the “open” worlds of Priest (2005) it is not simply that
Alice believes the system to be in a state inconsistent with Bob's beliefs about the actual state; Alice
believes the system to be in a state which Bob believes it could never conceivably be in under any
circumstances, even counterfactual ones.
49 Alice should ask not “What would make that true?” but “What would make Bob assert that to me?”
50 And this in turn requires us to be able to reason counterfactually, for example in the style of Stalnaker
(2006), about intensions.
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are not extensional propositions, so it doesn't fatally matter if different groups of users
hold mutually inconsistent beliefs about the state of the system.
All the stakeholdersmust agree that the system is secure, in the sense that they believe
the properties of the system to be consistent with their own security policy. Otherwise,
they would be unwilling to use the system. However, there does not need to be a
consensus about why the system is secure or about what facts and assumptions (includ-
ing trust assumptions) underpin “the proof” that the system is secure. There doesn't need
to be an agreed proof: it suffices that each group has their own reasons to believe their
own proof. If we unpack trust intensionally, then this can become an achievable goal.
Under this approach, designing secure systems to be used across multiple security
policy domains is more like diplomacy than engineering. The real threats to security
need not be agreed or even revealed. Although the agreed countermeasures may be real
and necessary, the threats they have been agreed to guard against (and the services they
are intended to provide) may be imaginary or impossible.
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